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During the mid-19th century, the role of the military in New Brunswick began to change. 
Although its primary function remained defence 
against invasion, the civil power called on it with 
increasing frequency; first the British regulars 
and later the militia assisted in capacities ranging 
from fighting fires to policing. Nevertheless, as 
New Brunswick changed from colony to province, 
the militia did not automatically replace the 
imperial garrison. Civil authorities were reluctant 
to call on it, and volunteers assumed this role 
only after the regulars departed in 1869. This 
article first examines the types of disorder that 
occurred between the 1830s and the 1870s. It 
next considers the 18 known instances during 
this period when the civil authorities called out 
British regulars and provincial (ie., county-based) 
militias to aid them. It finally looks at factors that 
discouraged such use of the militia. 
Types of Disorder 
Throughout the late colonial and early Confederation periods in New Brunswick, 
military forces – British regulars and provincial 
(county-based) militias – provided defence against 
threats from the south.1 Both forces defended the 
border during the so-called Aroostook War in 
1839 and the Fenian scare in 1866. From time 
to time, they also assisted residents and civil 
authorities, in operations ranging from pulling 
beached boats from sand bars in the St John 
River to fighting major fires.2 Occasionally, they 
acted as policemen to preserve law and order 
during and after disasters.3 In the wake of the 
Great Fire of Saint John on 20 June 1877, the 
mayor notified the British military commander 
in Halifax: “We need troops here at once. The 
vandals are stealing everything they can reach 
and we fear the worst from them.”4 However, 
usually the authorities called out troops to 
preserve the peace during and after large-scale 
local disturbances. [See the table on the next page 
for a complete list of events.]
Disorder occurred frequently in New Brunswick 
during the mid-19th century.5 There were 18 
disturbances involving the use of troops between 
1837 and 1877. I have identified four main 
causes: sectarian riots (ten in 1845-49 and 1875-
76), elections (one, in 1843-44), labour disputes 
(five in 1850-75), and lawlessness (two, in 1837 
and 1877).
Sectarian riots
During the 1840s, sectarian and nativist 
animosities between Protestant Orangemen and 
Irish-Catholic immigrants emerged because of 
complex local socio-economic forces.6 Numerous 
incidents took place, with serious riots in 1845 
(two) in Saint John and in Saint John and nearby 
Portland; in 1847 (three) in Saint John, Portland, 
Fredericton, and Woodstock (Carleton County); 
in 1848 in Woodstock; and in 1849 (two) in 
Saint John and in Saint John and Portland. As 
late as 1876, the civil power called out troops 
in Saint John (one event) in anticipation of 
Orange riots, although no disturbance occurred, 
except for a marcher who accidentally shot 
himself in the leg with his own revolver.7 As well, 
religious and linguistic tensions arising from 
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the 1871 Common Schools Act led to serious 
clashes between English-speaking Protestants 
and French-speaking Catholics at Caraquet in 
January 1875, in which a sheriff ’s volunteer and 
an Acadian protestor died (one event).8
Elections
Throughout the winter of 1842-43 and the 
following summer, widespread disorder took 
place in communities along the Miramichi River 
in Northumberland County during and after the 
so-called Fighting Elections campaigns.9 This 
event resulted in the intervention of troops.
Labour Disputes
In 1850, disorderly behaviour among Irish 
immigrant workers in railway construction 
necessitated sending a small detachment of 
troops to the St Croix area in southwestern 
New Brunswick.10 Railway workers’ strikes at 
Richmond near Woodstock in October 1862 and 
at Fredericton in June and in September 1869, 
and a strike by longshoremen in Saint John 
in May 1875, all resulted in the summoning of 
troops.11
Lawlessness
Violence broke out when “rowdyism” got out 
of hand. The first example occurred when 
lumbermen returning from the woods created 
such tumult in Woodstock in 1837 that 
the magistracy requested stationing of 
a company of regulars in the town to 
preserve the peace and protect inhabitants. 
The second occurred in June 1877, when 
the civil power called out troops during 
and after the Great Fire of Saint John to 
protect property.12
The Ultimate Sanction:
Calling Out the Troops
Authorities dealt with these disturbances in at least three ways – they could use 
law enforcement, intervene directly, or call 
on the military. Common and statute law 
vested responsibility for maintenance of 
peace and order with the civil authority, 
so the first line of defence was the local 
judicial and law-enforcement establishment 
– mayors (acting as chief magistrate), 
justices of the peace or magistrates, 
sheriffs, constables, special constables, night 
watches, and police, where they existed.13 
However, throughout most of this period the 
civilian constabulary generally proved incapable 
of handling serious disturbances, mainly because 
special constables were ineffective and police 
forces inadequate.14 Because local officials were 
frequently unable to keep the peace, “mob law,” 
or vigilantism, intervened, which inevitably led 
to confrontation and virtually ensured the need 
for troops. 
  Officials could intervene directly in 
confrontations, with varying degrees of success. 
In October 1862, Lieutenant-Governor Arthur H. 
Gordon prevailed without using troops when he 
personally interceded in the railway strike near 
Richmond.15 However, during the York Point riot 
in 1849, the mayor of Saint John failed. When he 
confronted the Irish Catholics, someone struck 
him in the head with a brick-bat, and rioters 
attempted to throw him into the open cellar of a 
recently burnt-out house. He managed to escape 
without more serious injury and then proceeded 
to the city barracks, where he directed the 
commandant of the garrison, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Charles Deane of the 1st (Royal) Regiment, to 
help restore order.16 
 Calling out the troops was usually a last 
resort. Common law would allow use of only 
Date Place (and County) Disturbance
1837 Woodstock (Carleton) Rowdyism
August 1843-
January 1844
Miramichi region 
(Northumberland) Post-election unrest
1 January 1845 Saint John (St John) Sectarian unrest
17 March 1845 Saint John, Portland (St John) Sectarian riot
12 July 1847 Saint John & Portland; Fredericton (York)
Sectarian riots
(2 separate events)
12 July-
19 October 1847 Woodstock Sectarian unrest
May 1848 Woodstock Sectarian unrest
6 March 1849 Saint John Sectarian riot
12 July 1849 Saint John, Portland Sectarian riot
1850 St Croix (Charlotte) Labour unrest
October 1862 Richmond (Carleton) Labour strike
2 June 1869 Fredericton Labour strike
23 September 1869 Fredericton Labour strike
January-March 1875 Caraquet (Gloucester) Sectarian unrest
6 May 1875 Saint John Labour strike
12 July 1876 Saint John Sectarian unrest
20 June 1877 Saint John Fire
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minimum force to suppress public disorder.17 
Authorities also wanted to limit confrontations 
between the military and citizenry. In 1845, 
Lieutenant-Colonel G. Whannell, commander of 
the British forces in New Brunswick, wrote: “I 
conceive it should be always borne in mind that 
calling out the Military to assist in quelling a 
disturbance should be the last measure resorted 
to by the Magistrates, and never adopted until 
all the means at their disposal have been found 
unavailing, it being at all times most desirable to 
avoid any collision between the Military and the 
people.”18
 In some cases, magistrates did resist 
summoning troops even though serious 
disturbances erupted and injuries occurred. 
During the sectarian riot in Fredericton in 1847, 
these officials took precautionary measures “to 
prevent any unnecessary interference of the 
Military.” The troops stayed in their barracks, 
and on several occasions magistrates dispersed 
the rioters. However, the marchers reassembled 
and during the night fired shots that killed a 
Catholic, and rioters from both parties were 
beaten. As Lieutenant-Governor Sir William 
Colebrooke noted, “It was not however found 
necessary to call out the Troops, and tranquillity 
was on the following day restored.”19 Magistrates 
also resisted ordering troops to intercede after 
their calling out. During the 1847 Woodstock 
riot, despite rioters’ firing upwards of 300 shots 
– which killed several people and wounded many 
others – the magistrates, “desirous to save any 
unnecessary Effusion of Blood,” did not call on 
the military to open fire.20
 Nevertheless troops received some 
unnecessary calls, much to the regret of the 
military and the community. In March 1845, 
Major F.W. Whingates, commander of the Saint 
John garrison, reported that that had happened 
twice in less than three months. He believed 
that, in response to the riot of 17 March, the 
mayor should have sworn in numerous special 
constables, prevented the mob from collecting, 
and then had the constables “fearlessly” arrest 
the rioters. Whingates worried that “the awe at 
present inspired by the presence of the Troops 
will by repetition be diminished, and that some 
When sheriff’s constables and volunteers tried to arrest Acadian protestors at Caraquet, NB on 27 January 1875, an 
exchange of gunﬁre left a volunteer and an Acadian dead. Justices of the peace subsequently requested assistance 
from the militia to suppress the disorder. Troops from the 73rd Northumberland Battalion and Newcastle Field Battery 
remained on station for six weeks.  Canadian Illustrated News, Vol. XI,  No. 7, Page 101. 
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day they will be fired upon from a bye lane or 
House, when bloodshed and slaughter will be 
the inevitable consequence.”21
 Authorities might request troops either pre-
emptively or in response to disturbances. Civic 
officials in garrison towns such as Saint John, 
where troops were readily at hand, received 
military assistance. Justices in more distant 
locations such as Newcastle and Woodstock, 
who had to apply to the executive for troops 
or reinforcements, faced greater difficulties. 
During the Miramichi election violence of 1843 
in Northumberland County, magistrates twice 
requested troops; the lieutenant-governor turned 
them down the first time and responded to the 
second request so late that the forces did not arrive 
until after the election.22 Generally, deployment 
of troops required certain conditions. In May 
1848, when the magistrates of Carleton County 
asked for more troops for Woodstock, Lieutenant-
Governor Sir Edmund Head agreed, but with 
strict guidelines.23 Although the magistracy was 
responsible for preserving the peace, governors 
could limit their freedom of action. 
 Once the forces assembled, they usually stayed 
in readiness until action or resolution. On a few 
occasions, troops acted against crowds. During 
the 1849 York Point riot, the mayor of Saint John 
led the troops to the site of the disturbances. 
According to the lieutenant-governor’s report, 
following an exchange of gunfire in which both 
parties suffered numerous casualties, the mayor 
read the prescribed riot act – more than once 
– to the Catholics. The crowds dispersed, and 
there were a few arrests; but the troops did not 
come into actual conflict with either party, except 
when marching through the crowd. However, the 
Orangemen later reassembled, and this time the 
troops intercepted and “broke through them,” 
whereupon the marchers retired.24 Although 
troops in New Brunswick may have come close 
to shooting on at least one occasion, as we see 
below, they never fired on rioters, unlike in the 
Canadas, where troops shot at crowds several 
times.25 
 As several observers pointed out, however, 
deployment of troops only quelled disturbances; 
it did not provide permanent solutions. As the 
Weekly Chronicle commented in the wake of the 
sectarian riot of 1 January 1845 in Saint John:
[The mayor] need not expect that he will be able 
to catch the demons by simply marching the 
troops past their dens, into which they pop at the 
sound of a whistle and out at the same call. The 
villains must be ‘bearded’ in their dens, whither 
the sight of the red coat and bayonet frighten 
them, and from their dens they must be dragged, 
and then punishment can be inflicted.
For this to happen, communities needed the 
active and impartial support of residents and an 
effective police force, both generally absent.26
 In most cases, the troops employed were 
infantrymen, but during a few of the disturbances 
in Saint John the Royal Artillery deployed its 
guns. During the 1845 riot on St. Patrick’s Day 
gunners placed a 6-pounder “well supplied with 
grape shot” near the Portland wharves, and 
during the York Point riot they set up a field-piece 
at the foot of Dock Street, “to be ready in case 
of emergency to rake the entire street.”27 Later, 
during the 1875 Gloucester County disturbances, 
2 officers and 41 non-commissioned officers 
(NCOs) and men of the militia’s Newcastle Field 
Battery guarded the jail and its Acadian prisoners 
in Bathurst with two 9-pounders. Unlike the 
Canadas, New Brunswick rarely used cavalry 
during these operations. It did so once, in the 
aftermath of the 1847 Orange riot at Woodstock, 
when a captain, 2 sergeants, and 16 men from 
the Carleton Light Dragoons patrolled the roads 
leading into town and during the next week or so 
brought in prisoners and witnesses.28 
 The number of troops employed varied. 
Sometimes forces were small. For instance, the 
Woodstock riot in July 1847 and the Fredericton 
Branch Railway strike in June 1869 brought out 
between 15 and 20 regulars, and the May 1875 
strike in Saint John, 50 militiamen. In most cases 
– the York Point riot in 1849, the Richmond strike 
in 1862, and the disturbances in Miramichi in 
1843 and Caraquet in 1875 – about 100 men 
acted. During the July 1876 Orange procession 
in Saint John, 130 officers and men were ready, 
and following the same city’s fire in 1877, 140 
officers and men from the 62nd Battalion (St 
John Fusiliers) and New Brunswick Artillery 
assembled. 
  Troops served in a variety of ways. During 
confrontations with crowds, they acted under 
the direct supervision of magistrates. After 
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Confederation, they generally operated in concert 
with the police. In the Fredericton Branch Railway 
strike of June 1869, the regulars accompanied 
the deputy sheriff and two policemen.29 During 
the 1875 Caraquet disorder, a detachment of 
the 73rd Northumberland Battalion protected 
constables while they arrested protestors and 
guarded prisoners and, in place of constables, 
mounted sentries at several establishments.30 
During the Saint John conflagration in 1877, 
militiamen kept back crowds while firemen 
extinguished the flames and afterwards placed 
guards on bank vaults and public buildings 
throughout the unburned portions of the city. The 
troops separated into several parties, each under 
an officer, and patrolled the streets at night with 
special constables.31
 Most callouts lasted only several hours. A few 
went on for a week, including the October 1862 
railway strike in Richmond, and after the Saint 
John fire troops remained encamped for 12 days. 
Unrest on the Miramichi in 1843-44 saw troops 
on station for over five months; after the 1847 
Woodstock riot, troops were on hand for over 
three months; and ongoing sectarian conflict in 
Gloucester County in 1875 required troops in 
Bathurst for six weeks.
 Until 1869, the government had both 
regular and militia forces at its disposal. Before 
Confederation, officials usually called on regulars, 
except in frontier Carleton County, which used 
the Carleton Light Dragoons in Woodstock in 
1847, and the 1862 Richmond strike, when 
Lieutenant-Colonel William Baird of the Carleton 
County Militia claimed that Lieutenant-Governor 
Gordon directed him to hold his rifle company 
in readiness for active service at Woodstock.32 
Both regular and militia forces served in a 
constabulary role or waited in readiness some 
miles away. Militiamen sometimes formed part 
of the civilian constabulary; for instance, troops 
in Carleton County served with special armed 
police following the Woodstock riot of 1847.33
 It was only after British regulars departed in 
1869 – and before Canada set up a permanent 
force – that the authorities began using local 
militias to quell disturbances. On 23 September 
1869, over 200 men of the York and Queens 
County militia were attending a camp of 
instruction near the Fredericton railway station 
when the riot occurred. The mayor called 
for assistance on Major Hewitson, the camp 
commandant, who detailed the Queens County 
company, which marched to the scene and “made 
In late June 1877, ﬁre devastated much of the city of Saint John.  Local militia were called out to control crowds during 
the ﬁre, and protect property and patrol the streets afterwards.    Canadian Illustrated News, Vol. XVI, No. 1, Pages 8-9.
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short work of the rioters.”34 In 1875, magistrates 
called on the Newcastle Field Battery and 73rd 
Battalion35 during the Caraquet disturbances 
and on the 62nd Battalion to stand in readiness 
during the dockworkers’ strike. The next year, 
detachments of the 62nd and provincial artillery 
again stood to during the Jubilee Orangeman’s 
march through Saint John. 
 However, authorities still called on British 
troops at least once. In the aftermath of the 
devastating Saint John fire in 1877, despite 
the presence of 140 city militiamen and offers 
of service from several militia battalions 
throughout the province, the authorities asked 
for assistance from British regulars, the mayor 
explaining to the British commander in Halifax 
that “our volunteers have lost their arms and 
clothing.”36 Over the next few days, imperial 
forces arrived from Nova Scotia on HMS Argus 
with a detachment of marine artillery, and two 
companies of the 97th Regiment reached Saint 
John by rail. These troops stayed between one 
and two weeks and assisted in various military 
duties, including patrolling the streets and 
pulling down walls.37
Factors Discouraging
Use of the Militia 
In the absence of effective police forces, various military forces might help maintain public 
order. During the first half of the 19th century, 
authorities in Britain used both regulars and 
such auxiliary troops as the militia, corps of 
Yeomanry, and pensioners, although the regulars 
remained the bulwark against rioters.38 By mid-
century, in the Canadas, British regulars and 
local provincials and militias aiding the civil 
power had also become standard.39 
 However, in New Brunswick summoning 
auxiliary forces presented several problems. 
During an early episode two concerns – legal and 
fiscal – surfaced. In the early 1820s, widespread 
unrest on the Miramichi had necessitated 
the presence of a detachment of the British 
74th Regiment. In 1823, the army considered 
withdrawing the regulars, despite magistrates’ 
fears that lawlessness would soon reappear. When 
the government considered using the militia in 
their place, two issues arose. First, the militia’s 
legal status was unclear; legislation had dropped 
the forces’ traditional role as posse comitatus 
vis-à-vis insurrection or rebellion. Moreover, 
as David Facey-Crowther has pointed out, the 
disturbance was hardly insurrection or rebellion. 
Second, who would pay? If local government 
failed to cover costs, the colony, which had few 
resources, might be responsible.40
  The Richmond strike in October 1862 
produced other worries. At the outset of the 
disturbance, Lieutenant-Governor Gordon 
refused the county sheriff ’s request to employ the 
militia and decided that he would send regulars. 
He wrote to the secretary of state, the Duke of 
Newcastle, in November 1862: “Militia Volunteers 
are, as it appears to me, the most unsuitable force 
that could well be employed for the prevention 
Arthur Hamilton Gordon was lieutenant-governor of New 
Brunswick between 1861 and 1866. He was reluctant 
to call out the militia to aid the civil authority, preferring 
to use British regulars. He personally interceded to end 
the railroad strike near Richmond, NB in October 1862, 
before troops had to be committed. 
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and suppression of riot.” He claimed militiamen 
did not have the discipline to control a riot. He 
might have noted as well their potential personal 
interest and partiality, which allegedly affected 
callouts in Britain and the Canadas.)41 Militia, 
moreover, might lack the presence to overawe 
the crowd – their main method of deterrence. 
Finally, because they were members of the local 
community their involvement could worsen the 
situation.42
Statutory Limitations
Lieutenant-Governor Gordon was not alone in his 
doubts about employing militia against crowds. 
His experience in Scotland as commanding 
officer of a volunteer battalion undoubtedly made 
him aware that civil officials and the military in 
Britain were reluctant to use volunteer militias 
to assist the civil power – an attitude that was 
common in the Canadas as well.43
 Did the militia’s legal status prevent a more 
active role at mid-century? During the colonial 
era, the circumstances for callouts – as defined 
by the Militia Acts – did broaden somewhat. 
The 1825 act referred only to invasion. The 
acts of 1862 and 1865 cited war, invasion or 
insurrection, or imminent danger of any of them; 
but unlike the Canadas’ 1855 Militia Act they did 
not mention aid to the civil power. The Dominion 
Militia Act of 1868 addressed this issue.44 
Costs 
Municipal i t ies and counties had chief 
responsibility for paying regulars and militiamen 
alike.45 Local governments in New Brunswick 
before 1867 frequently could not defray the 
military’s costs (pay, transport, food, lodging). 
For example, Lieutenant-Governor Head agreed 
to send more troops to Woodstock in 1848, but 
only after the Carleton County magistrates agreed 
to pay the bills. Although the justices acquiesced, 
they pointed out that the county’s finances 
“render utterly hopeless the prospect” of prompt 
payment.46 Yet, as Colebrooke had stated in July 
1843 during the Miramichi election disturbances, 
who paid for conveying troops from Fredericton 
to Newcastle was of secondary importance to the 
shortage of wagons and horses to transport the 
soldiers over 100 miles by road. In the end, the 
colony absorbed the costs.47
 After Confederation, the indirect costs of 
using the militia may have deterred its use at 
least once. As militia officials frequently pointed 
out, the volunteers gave up time and money 
during training and callouts. During Saint John’s 
Great Fire of 1877, the city’s decision to call on 
regulars from Halifax rather than use additional 
local militiamen may have been partly a matter 
of economics. New Brunswick’s deputy adjutant 
general, indignant that British troops stood in 
for his forces, noted that, even though numerous 
militiamen were available, the authorities 
“deemed it necessary to secure the services of a 
detachment of H.M. 97th Regiment from Halifax, 
probably not desiring, on economical grounds, 
to withdraw more of the Active Militia than were 
then and there assembled from their industrial 
pursuits.”48 
Deficient Discipline 
In 1864, the adjutant general noted that 
companies formed into battalions tended 
to consider themselves independent corps. 
Moreover, officers were not strict enough in 
enforcing rules and orders and in some instances 
did not follow orders from above.49 On at least 
one occasion, officers may have had difficulty 
calling out soldiers to support public order. 
According to Lieutenant-Colonel J.R. MacShane, 
who commanded the 62nd Battalion during the 
1875 dockworkers’ strike in Saint John, once 
the mayor had warned him that violence was 
likely in the morning he ordered a detachment 
to stand ready throughout the day. He noted that 
when a disturbance was imminent it was difficult 
to guarantee troops’ appearance unless they were 
already on duty, so he drew up his detachment 
at six o’clock in the morning.50 
 Was the militia undisciplined, as Gordon 
feared it would be? During the aftermath of the 
Saint John fire in 1877, the chief of police refused 
to answer the challenge of a militia sentry at the 
Bank of New Brunswick. In response, the gunner 
brandished his revolver and drove the chief back 
on his men. However, the militiaman may not 
have realized that he was subordinate to the civil 
authority and may have resented the police for 
not having shown due respect for the volunteers.51 
Indeed, members of the militia seem in general to 
have behaved in a soldier-like way. In September 
1869, the first use of the militia in Fredericton 
evoked no negative response. According to the 
New Brunswick Reporter, although the riot “was 
but a small affair in itself, it seems designed to 
show, in the event of serious disturbances, the 
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advantages of having men disciplined and trained 
in readiness to preserve the public peace.”52 
Similarly, during the 1875 Caraquet disturbances 
in Gloucester County, the Newcastle Field Battery 
maintained good conduct and discipline while 
staying at Bathurst through the winter.53
 Moreover, MacShane’s difficulty may have 
been an isolated problem. Lieutenant-Colonel 
Caleb McCulley, brigade major of 3rd Brigade, 
who commanded the militia detachments during 
the Caraquet troubles, reported that “both 
officers and men have all endeavoured to hasten 
to the support of the lawful authorities, and 
have performed their duties with praiseworthy 
exertion and perseverance.”54
 At least two factors help to explain the militia’s 
steady conduct in various episodes. Officers took 
steps to avoid unnecessary tension between their 
forces and the crowds. Following customary 
practice in employing the military for riot control, 
they used troops from outside the area whenever 
possible. Soldiers from Queens County assisted 
during the June 1869 strike in Fredericton (York 
County), and units from Northumberland were 
used during the Caraquet disorder. Officers also 
tried to isolate troops from protestors. During the 
1875 longshoremen’s strike, MacShane kept his 
men inside their quarters in the Customs House 
while they were on duty and obtained their meals 
at an adjacent hotel – “to avoid the appearance 
of menace.”55 
 According to many writers, traditionally 
the military has disliked assisting the civil 
authority,56 but this was not always the case in 
New Brunswick. The post-Confederation militia 
exhibited a keenness reminiscent of the earlier 
volunteer spirit and took pride in fulfilling this 
duty. For example, in 1875 Major R.R. Call, who 
commanded the Newcastle Field Battery during 
the Caraquet disorder, wrote: “While we regret 
the unfortunate circumstance which necessitated 
our presence…still we know it was our duty 
to carry out instructions with as little delay as 
possible, and feel that not only as volunteers, but 
as citizens of the Dominion we should be ready 
and willing at all times to aid the civil power to 
carry out the laws by which we are governed.”57
 Such a positive attitude was also the result 
of a growing sense of professional pride. During 
the aftermath of the Saint John fire, the deputy 
adjutant general reported that the 900 officers 
and men from the Kings, Westmorland, York, 
and Carleton regiments, who were performing 
their annual drill nearby, were ready to reinforce 
the Saint John militia at short notice. Moreover, 
he had also received offers of service from the 
commanding officers of the 8th Regiment of 
Cavalry and 67th Battalion. As the local brigade 
major reported, “it is needless to say that if 
the services of these…corps, or either of them, 
had been accepted, the necessary authority 
for their employment could have been easily 
obtained, and the detachment of the Imperial 
force rendered wholly unnecessary.”58 Thus fears 
about the militia’s lack of discipline, at least after 
Confederation, seem groundless.59
 Conversely, were the regulars steadier and 
more reliable, as Gordon maintained? Certainly 
the regulars were often very efficient in aiding the 
civil power. In mid-October 1843, the magistrates 
and inhabitants of the Miramichi commended 
the departing redcoats for their “good order and 
conduct…especially in their intercourse with 
the inhabitants of this place, accompanied as it 
has been, by that strict discipline, which is the 
characteristic of the British soldier, and renders 
him so efficient in the field.”60 The Carleton 
County justices of the peace noted that during 
the 1847 Woodstock riot Lieutenant Wickham, 
who commanded the detachment of the 33rd 
Regiment, was on the ground immediately with 
his men once the magistrates called on him, and 
“we cannot say too much in Commendation of 
his Coolness, Forbearance, Determination and 
Firmness, and we should be doing him Injustice 
if we did not very mainly ascribe to his presence 
and Exertions, the Ultimate Suppression of the 
Riot.”61 Following the 1862 Woodstock strike, 
Colonel J. Amber Cole of the 15th Regiment 
reported on his troops’ conduct as “exceedingly 
good,” and Gordon described it as “most 
exemplary.”62 
 Nevertheless lapses in discipline did occur, 
at least during fire-fighting duty. During a large 
shipyard conflagration in Portland in August 
1841, detachments of the 36th Regiment and 
Royal Artillery fought the flames, while another 
detachment of infantry arrived in marching order 
with muskets and bayonets and took up positions 
to guard property and keep back the crowds. 
“Some unpleasantness” ensued when Lieutenant 
Thistlewayte, commander of a squad, ordered 
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a number of members of 
the Protection Fire Club 
out of the neighbourhood. 
According to one account: 
“ the members of  this 
body were most of them 
prominent citizens, and 
their aims were similar to 
those of the salvage corps…
When they were ordered 
away they remonstrated, 
whereupon the officer 
ordered the soldiers to 
charge, which command 
was only countermanded 
through the interference of 
Mr. Payne, the magistrate.” 
To make matters worse, 
when the blaze was over 
“the return to barracks 
was not always a striking 
display, for the soldiers 
were not averse to accepting 
stimulating draughts as 
a reward for their valor, 
and some extraordinary 
scenes were at times the 
result.” Sailors from HM 
Brig Racer, which was lying 
to in the harbour, assisted 
the troops. During the 
excitement, several sailors deserted, and once 
the fire was under control the vessel had to “race” 
down the coast to apprehend them before they 
escaped into Maine.63 
 British troops also on occasion exhibited 
slack discipline in the presence of civilians. 
Imperial soldiers were unpopular with some New 
Brunswickers and became the target of attacks by 
townspeople, especially in Saint John and by its 
Irish Catholics.64 In a few cases, these assaults led 
to questionable acts by British forces, including 
serious unauthorized retaliation. In October 
1845, Saint Johners frequenting brothels near 
the garrison clashed with troops who used 
their bayonets against them.65 Similarly, in 
Woodstock in the late 1830s, following an attack 
on two British soldiers, a confrontation occurred 
between disorderly lumbermen and British 
regulars. According to William Baird:
Presently a sub-division front of the soldiers, 
filling Water Street from side to side, was seen 
advancing at the double with fixed bayonets. 
The crowd was not slow to discover that the 
red-coats meant business, and as leaves eddy 
and whirl before the thunder storm, so did the 
valiant (?) crowd disappear, rushing into front 
doors, cellar doors, and alley ways to escape 
the thrust of the bayonet. Pricking the building 
and front of stores…the word ‘right about’ was 
given by Sergeant Tracey, the non-commissioned 
officer in command of the sub-division, which 
marched quietly to its quarters. The majesty of 
the law was asserted.66 
The murder of Private John Brennan of the 22nd 
Regiment in October 1868 precipitated a similar 
riot by soldiers in Fredericton.67 Although the 
British performed admirably against rioters, 
these incidents raise doubts about Gordon’s 
belief that they would always act in a disciplined 
way with civilians.
Partiality
Although there has been no detailed study of 
the composition of the late colonial and early 
Confederation active militia in New Brunswick, 
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we know that many of the men were urban 
members of the middle class.68 Their officers 
were generally “men of position and some private 
means,” especially in the more fashionable 
artillery batteries, which “held the palm of 
superiority.” The majority of the gunners were 
bank clerks and students, while the rank and file 
of the infantry were active in “industrial pursuits” 
– probably skilled artisans.69 Some volunteer 
units, particularly in Saint John, had strong 
links with the Protestant community, especially 
the Orange Order. The earliest efforts to organize 
a volunteer company in that city occurred in 
autumn 1859, when several members of the 
Orange Lodge in Portland discussed forming a 
unit to demonstrate their patriotism. In early 
1860, John S. Hall, a prominent member of 
the lodge, was the catalyst for the creation of 
the Havelock Rifles, which he subsequently 
commanded for several years. There soon 
followed the Queen’s Own Rifles, which also had 
many Orangemen. Finally, a number of members 
of the Woodstock Rifle Company marched with 
the Orange demonstrators during the 1847 
riot.70
  Parties in these sectarian and labour 
confrontations perhaps counted on the militia to 
support the status quo against such dissenters as 
Irish Catholics and striking railway construction 
workers. When the manager of the New Brunswick 
and Canada Railway called on the county sheriff to 
protect company property during the Richmond 
strike, he requested the Charlotte and Carleton 
militias.71 When the sheriff passed on this 
request to Fredericton, Gordon overruled it for 
the reasons we saw above. There is no evidence 
either that the pre-Confederation militia failed to 
act impartially or that aid to the civil power after 
1867 led to indiscipline.
 Militiamen may have been ignorant about 
the groups they confronted – a result of the wide 
social gulf between most volunteers and the 
protestors. Militiamen frequently encountered 
demonstrators who were “outsiders,” such 
as Irish railway construction workers, or 
locals whose cause was obscure. Captain 
Warren Franklin Hatheway, an officer in the 
detachment of the 62nd standing ready during 
the longshoremen’s strike in Saint John in May 
1875, wrote: “We, the militia, knew nothing about 
the rights of the dock workers. If a disturbance 
had occurred, and our Col. had sent us to the 
Square to quell it, we would have fired upon the 
rioters.”72 His comment suggests a detached view 
that resembled that of the regulars.  
 Were the British regulars more impartial 
because they were strangers, as Gordon claimed? 
Cursory evidence reveals that they did not long 
remain outsiders. British garrisons had been 
present in some towns for several decades, 
and troops had established strong links with 
civilians. For instance, in the early 1820s Irish 
officers from the Saint John garrison joined 
with local businessmen, professionals, and 
tradesmen to form the St. Patrick’s Society, 
which provided leadership for the city’s Irish 
community. The British army also transplanted 
the Orange Order to British North America. 
During the early 19th century, British units in 
New Brunswick had many Orangemen, who, 
between 1818 and 1831, continuously supported 
a military lodge in Saint John. Even after civilian 
lodges emerged, British soldiers continued to 
staff them into the mid-1840s, after which time 
native New Brunswickers took control.73 The 
last regiment to garrison Fredericton, the 22nd, 
remained for three years and entered fully into 
the city’s social and economic life. By the time it 
departed in May 1869, 80 members had married 
local women with leave, and another 50 to 60 
had done so without leave. The New Brunswick 
Reporter observed that their departure was a 
“matter of general regret,” although farmers and 
storekeepers’ loss of so many customers seems 
to have caused most of this sadness.74
 Did these close community ties jeopardize 
the regulars’ impartiality? Direct evidence is 
scanty and difficult to interpret. During the 1847 
sectarian tumult in Fredericton some soldiers 
of the 33rd Regiment did become involved in 
the riot, even though the civil authority had not 
summoned them. Captain Walker helped a man 
under attack by Catholics, and when the crowd 
turned on him he had to draw his sword in self-
defence. Another individual whom the protestors 
were pursuing ran up to the barracks gate and 
gained admission while soldiers kept the rioters 
at bay with bayonets – but to protect people in 
danger or to support Orangemen? Similarly, a 
magistrate later reported hearing of an Orange 
flag going up at the barracks, but did it fly 
over the facility – a serious breach of military 
discipline – or did it belong to the Orangemen at 
the barracks gate?75 
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 An episode in Saint John does seem to 
indicate a British bias in favour of Orangemen. 
On 6 March 1849, after restoring order in the 
streets, regulars escorted a large number of 
besieged Orangemen home by surrounding them 
with a “protection guard.”76 Some historians 
suggest that efforts to control riots in Saint John 
in the late 1840s may have created a “fusion” 
between all levels of authority, including British 
troops and the Orange Order. 77 This may be 
overstating the case; the lieutenant-governor’s 
account of the York Point riot indicates that the 
mayor used troops against both sides, once 
against the Catholics and twice against the 
Orangemen.78 Moreover, soldiers did not have a 
free hand; they acted under the direction of civil 
authorities, who may indeed have had a vested 
interest in the outcome. An officer in the midst 
of a riot would have disobeyed a magistrate at 
his peril. Nevertheless, although a more concrete 
assessment must await further study, evidence 
does suggest that British troops did not always 
act impartially.
Lack of Presence
Some militia units did present an imposing 
image. According to the regimental history of 
the 62nd Battalion, in May 1875, when the 
detachment of the 62nd was ready to deal with 
ship labourers’ violence in Saint John, “[t]he 
moral effect of such a Force, thoroughly armed 
and equipped, and ready to act at a moment’s 
notice, served the desired end, and no further 
trouble arising, the force was dismissed in the 
evening.”79 And in the wake of the city’s great fire 
of 1877, the mayor assured the militia forces 
on duty that the good order “was due in great 
measure to their presence.”80 Although, as we see 
below, the militia suffered from a general lack of 
confidence, there is nothing to indicate loss of 
nerve during specific events. 
 How accurate was Gordon’s observation 
about the impact of regulars’ presence on 
rioters? In some instances, especially in smaller, 
spontaneous incidents, protestors did disperse 
quickly once British troops appeared. During the 
Ofﬁcers of the 22nd Regiment in front of the Ofﬁcers’ Quarters in Fredericton, NB.
The 22nd was the last British regiment to garrison the city, from 1866 to May 1869.  
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1869 railway strike in Fredericton the arrival of 
the detachment of the 60th Rifles had an almost 
instantaneous effect. According to the New 
Brunswick Reporter, “On seeing the ‘Dark Green 
Jackets’ a regular skedaddle took place, equalled 
only by the celebrated ‘Bulls [sic] Run.’”81
 However, during larger confrontations with 
“veteran” rioters this was not always the case. 
Sometimes demonstrators disappeared when 
troops arrived, only to reassemble after the 
redcoats had departed. During the riot in Saint 
John on 1 January 1845, a bugle sounded as 
the soldiers approached, whereupon the rioters 
dispersed, so that by the time the military arrived 
scarcely anyone remained. “The military paraded 
up and down for some time, and after finding that 
every thing was peaceable, they marched back to 
their barracks again. The military were no sooner 
out of sight, than the hell-hounds again assembled 
to carry on their lawless depredations.”82 
 Occasionally the crowds were more defiant. 
During the 1845 St. Patrick’s Day riot in Saint 
John, the troops stayed for several hours, by 
which time the people had dispersed, “without 
any further display than the brandishing of a 
few clubs, the distant firing of several muskets 
into the air, and a large portion of threatening 
language.”83
 In at least two instances, demonstrators 
openly defied the British. During the 1847 
Woodstock riot, both Catholics and Orangemen 
ignored the magistrates and the small contingent 
of regulars and opened fire on one another.84 
Perhaps the most serious confrontation occurred 
at Chatham (Northumberland County) on 27 
August 1843; less than 24 hours after arriving on 
the Miramichi, troops had to quell a disturbance 
involving some 500 people. A peace commissioner 
reported to Lieutenant-Governor Colebrooke that 
nothing serious occurred, but two newspapers 
wrote about far more serious clashes, with troops 
only moments away from firing on the defiant 
crowd.85
Antagonizing Civilians 
Was there reason to fear the negative, long-term 
effects that using the militia could have on the 
community, as Gordon suggested? During at least 
one episode, its employment apparently did not 
antagonize residents. When the Newcastle Field 
Battery departed Bathurst (Gloucester County) 
in March 1875, Senator John Ferguson and 37 
justices of the peace and others expressed their 
thanks: 
The readiness with which you have performed 
duties, in many respects most difficult, have 
been worthy of praise. The strict discipline 
maintained, and the exemplary conduct of the 
men, have been frequent subjects of remark, 
and may be just cause for congratulation. While 
we are grateful therefore, that the state of the 
county will justify the removal of the battery, we 
Soldiers from the 62nd Battalion, St. John Fusiliers, ca 1880. They were called out to aid the civil authority during a 
dock workers’ strike in May 1875, the Orange procession in July 1876, and the Saint John ﬁre in 1877.  
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are no less pleased that its conduct amongst us 
has been such as not to leave any ground for 
complaint.86 
The Acadian population saw things differently. 
A representative remarked that there had been 
no need “for the calling of the Prussian Army 
to Caraquet by the Bismarcks and Kaisers of 
Gloucester.” Nevertheless, the contending parties 
eventually reached a compromise on common 
schools.87 
 The use of militia forces during the 1875 
dockworkers’ strike in Saint John created 
hard feelings. The day after the call-up, the 
Irish-Catholic Morning Freeman observed 
sardonically: “People wondered why a number 
of Volunteers appeared in the streets in their 
uniforms yesterday, and asked what the matter 
was. Everything else looked peaceful and quiet 
as possible, and the town was indeed unusually 
dull. Were the Fenians again on the border, or 
what was the matter?”88 During the May term of 
the Saint John Circuit Court, the chief justice 
stated that, in view of recent violence, including 
a brutal attack on a merchant, the decision to 
hold troops in readiness was appropriate.89 The 
Morning Freeman disagreed: the strike was 
neither an unlawful assembly nor a riot, and 
summoning troops would seriously injure the 
port, “as shipowners and ship agents abroad 
must suppose that in sending their vessels to a 
port where such serious measures are necessary 
they run a very great risk.”90 Still, the incident 
probably did not contribute to any long-lasting 
animosity. 
 Did use of regulars to aid civil power cause 
less conflict because they were “strangers”? 
Lieutenant Thistlewayte’s confrontation with the 
Protection Fire Club in Saint John later became 
the source of some indignant resolutions, but 
a short time later the difficulty was “amicably 
arranged.”91 Similar “unpleasantness” arose 
between the garrison and citizens in Fredericton. 
In 1866, the commanding officer of the 22nd, 
Colonel Harding, was inadvertently doused during 
a blaze and subsequently withdrew the garrison’s 
fire-fighting services. Because the garrison was 
such an important source of manpower in these 
fire-ridden times, these circumstances eventually 
became the focus of earnest correspondence 
between the mayor and the British commander 
in the Maritimes.92
  Confrontations between regulars and 
residents certainly could sour relations and 
leave bitter memories on both sides. Both 
Harding and the mayor mentioned the murder 
of Private Brennan and the subsequent soldiers’ 
riot in Fredericton with great regret during a 
farewell ceremony for the 22nd in May 1869.93 
In at least one case, use of troops probably 
harmed relations, even though it is likely that 
soldiers had little say in the event. The 1847 
Woodstock riot drove a wedge between Catholics 
and Protestants, and during the aftermath 
Fredericton’s government appeared to favour 
the Orangemen by, among other things, again 
sending troops to deter more violence during the 
trial of the Irish-Catholic rioters. The decision 
came in response to a petition signed by locals 
– most of them Orangemen – who used this 
event to consolidate their position, gaining the 
upper hand in this continuing struggle.94 Once 
again, Gordon’s assumption about the long-
term effect of employing British troops seems 
questionable. 
 It is likely that the militia’s failure to inspire 
general confidence discouraged its use in support 
of the civil authority. Troops did not just prevent 
riots and disperse crowds; they were also to 
allay alarm, inspire hope, and generally sustain 
the community and its leaders during difficult 
times.95 It was in this capacity that the militia 
was found most wanting. 
 There can be little doubt that the regulars 
– even small contingents such as Lieutenant 
Wickham’s detachment during the Woodstock 
riot in 1847 – inspired hard-pressed magistrates. 
Indeed many New Brunswickers saw the 
redcoats as their only source of protection, and 
the prospect of their withdrawal in the wake of 
a disturbance unnerved residents.96 After the 
1842-43 election riots on the Miramichi, a peace 
commissioner informed Colebroke that local 
police could maintain order if they had a strong 
force to fall back on in case of need. “In this point 
of view a military detachment is… essential. The 
moral effect of such a force is what is required to 
give confidence to the Civil Power…the probable 
withdrawal of the Troops is looked upon with 
terror by all people of property.”97
 It is doubtful that the militia, either before or 
after Confederation, evoked the same degree of 
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confidence. During the early years of this study, 
some observers held the militia in low regard 
and saw it as a needless financial burden and 
source of moral corruption.98 During the 1850s 
and 1860s, enthusiasm waxed and waned with 
the political atmosphere.99 After Confederation, 
the volunteers did have some ardent supporters, 
such as the New Brunswick Reporter, which 
claimed that the militia could in six days turn 
out a set of men as well drilled as it took the 
regulars six months to achieve.100 Still, as the 
deputy adjutant general, Lieutenant-Colonel 
George Maunsell, noted in 1869, the volunteers 
faced a general lack of support, especially in 
Saint John, once a stronghold of enthusiasm: 
“I sincerely hope that the community generally 
will ere long become fully sensible of the fact 
that as the Imperial troops are being withdrawn, 
the Local Force becomes the standing army of 
Canada, ready and willing to repel invasion, or 
aid the civil power, and maintain peace within 
our borders, and surely it is not too much to 
ask for support and encouragement from the 
people.”101
     This general lack of confidence probably 
helped bring about the decision to supplement 
the militia with regulars in the wake of the 1877 
Saint John fire: “Fears are entertained by the 
more thoughtful citizens that the remaining 
portion of the city is in danger from the large 
numbers of reckless and desperate men that 
are now unemployed, and roam at large without 
check of any kind to restrain them, and thought 
it expedient that the community be under military 
protection.”102
     The city waited “in hourly expectation” 
of British troops from Halifax, not of New 
Brunswick militiamen. Saint Johners paid scant 
attention to the offended sensibilities of the 
militia once the regulars arrived. The mayor’s 
praise notwithstanding, we can see public 
attitudes in light-hearted newspaper accounts of 
the provincial artillery’s attempts to blow down 
the walls of burnt-out buildings with bags of 
gunpowder, one of which blew up the lieutenant in 
charge and killed a bystander.103 Until the militia 
became a reliable military force – which it did 
only after the period under review - it could not 
serve as New Brunswick’s main support for the 
civil authority.104 
Citizens of Saint John living in tents on Barrack Square after being left homeless by the Great Fire of June 1877. 
N
ew
 B
ru
ns
w
ic
k 
M
us
eu
m
, S
ai
nt
 J
oh
n,
 N
.B
. X
11
29
6
Wilson - NB Militia.indd   46 22/05/2008   3:50:33 PM
14
Canadian Military History, Vol. 17 [2008], Iss. 2, Art. 4
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol17/iss2/4
47
Conclusion 
A detailed assessment of the factors that critics advanced against using the militia to aid the 
civil power reveals mixed findings. Like several 
other studies of the use of auxiliary forces to 
assist civil authorities, this analysis fails to 
substantiate some of the arguments against 
employing militia.105 In particular, statutory 
limitations and financial burdens do not appear 
to have been serious obstacles. Likewise, fear 
of slack discipline had no basis in fact, and 
there is no evidence that militiamen failed to 
act impartially. Moreover, their presence did 
on occasion intimidate protestors. But anxiety 
about the local impact of calling out the militia 
was appropriate. 
 Of course, these findings apply only to 
the New Brunswick militia in the period after 
Confederation and do not necessarily mean that 
Gordon’s views on the militia were not valid 
before 1867. Until greater detail about use of 
the colonial militia to aid civil power becomes 
available, the record will remain unclear.106 
However, this analysis does show that some of 
the lieutenant-governor’s arguments in favour of 
employing regulars were not valid for this earlier 
era. Contrary to his beliefs, British troops did not 
always perform their duties, especially fighting 
fires, in a disciplined manner, although their 
conduct when confronting crowds was admirable. 
Similarly, they did not always act impartially, nor 
did they always have the effect on crowds that 
Gordon described. Finally, the use of regulars 
did contribute to lingering problems within 
communities, as we saw in Woodstock, although 
the troops had little or no say in the matter. One 
can conclude only that in most cases the militia 
was neither worse nor better prepared than 
were the regulars for this kind of duty and that 
the government and civil authority’s reluctance 
to use the militia came more from general lack 
of public confidence in volunteers’ capacity than 
from the realities of events. 
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